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Household expenditureThis study estimates the combined direct and indirect rebound effects from various types of energy efﬁciency
improvement and behavioural change by UK households and explores how these effects vary with total
expenditure. The methodology is based upon estimates of the expenditure elasticity and GHG intensity of 16
categories of goods and services, and allows for the capital cost and embodied emissions of the energy efﬁciency
measures themselves. The study ﬁnds that rebound effects, in GHG terms, are modest (0–32%) for measures
affecting domestic energy use, larger (25–65%) for measures affecting vehicle fuel use and very large
(66–106%) for measures that reduce food waste. Furthermore, measures undertaken by low income households
are associated with the largest rebound effects, with direct emissions forming a larger proportion of the total
rebound effect for those households. Measures that are subsidised or affect highly taxed energy commodities
may be less effective in reducing aggregate emissions. These ﬁndings highlight the importance of allowing for
rebound effects within policy appraisals, as well as reinforcing the case for economy-wide carbon pricing.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
‘Rebound effects’ is a widely used umbrella term for a variety of
economic responses to improved energy efﬁciency and ‘energy-saving’
behavioural change. The net result of these effects is typically to increase
energy consumption and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions relative to a
counterfactual baseline in which these responses do not occur. To the
extent that rebound effects are neglected in policy appraisals, the ener-
gy and emissions ‘saved’ by suchmeasuresmay be less than anticipated.
For example, energy efﬁcient light-bulbs will make lighting cheaper,
thereby encouraging people to illuminate larger areas to higher levels
over longer periods of time. Responses such as this will offset some of
the potential energy and GHG savings.
This paper estimates the rebound effects following a number of
energy efﬁciency improvements and behavioural changes by UK house-
holds. These effects are estimated in terms of GHG emissions, rather
than energy consumption, and are averaged over a ten-year period.
While there is a growing literature on rebound effects for households
(Sorrell et al., 2009a), the majority of studies focus solely upon direct
rebound effects and neglect the associated indirect rebound effects
which may frequently be of comparable magnitude. There are also
very few studies that investigate how these rebound effects vary(Science and Technology Policy
273 877067.
. This is an open access article underbetween different types of households. This study therefore seeks to
estimate the magnitude of both direct and indirect rebound effects
from the selected measures and to investigate how these vary between
different income groups. The study builds upon earlier analyses by
Druckman et al. (2011) and Chitnis et al. (2013).
2. Concepts and Previous Work
To aid understanding of rebound effects for households, we make
the following distinctions:
• Direct versus indirect rebound effects: For households, direct rebound
effects derive from increased consumption of energy services, such
as heating or lighting,whose effective price has fallen as a result of im-
proved energy efﬁciency. For example, the replacement of traditional
light-bulbs with compact ﬂuorescents will make lighting cheaper, so
people may choose to use higher levels of illumination or not switch
lights off in unoccupied rooms. In contrast, indirect rebound effects
derive from increased consumption of other goods and services
(e.g. leisure, clothing) that also require energy and GHG emissions
to provide. For example, the cost savings from more energy efﬁcient
lighting may be put towards an overseas holiday.
• Efﬁciency versus sufﬁciency rebound effects: Rebound effects for house-
holds do not result solely from energy efﬁciency improvements, such
as installing energy-efﬁcient boilers, but also from behavioural
changes, such as reducing average internal temperatures. This isthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
Table 1
Previous estimates of combined direct and indirect rebound effects for households.
Author Region No. of commodity
categories
Measure Area Metric Energy/emissions Estimated rebound
effect (%)
Lenzen and Dey (2002) Australia 150 Efﬁciency & sufﬁciency Food; heating GHGs Direct and embodied 45–123%
Alfredsson (2004) Sweden 300 Sufﬁciency Food; travel; utilities CO2 Direct and embodied 7–300%
Brannlund et al. (2007) Sweden 13 Efﬁciency Transport; utilities CO2 Direct and embodied 120–175%
Mizobuchi (2008) Japan 13 Efﬁciency Transport; utilities Energy Direct and embodied 12–38%
Kratena and Wuger (2008) Austria 6 Efﬁciency Transport; heating; electricity Energy Direct only 37–86%
Druckman et al. (2011) UK 16 Sufﬁciency Transport, heating, food GHGs Direct and embodied 7–51%
Thomas and Azevedo (2013) US 74 Efﬁciency Transport, electricity GHGs Direct and embodied 7–25%
Murray (2013) Australia 36 Efﬁciency & sufﬁciency Transport, lighting GHGs Direct and embodied 4–24%
Chitnis et al. (2013) UK 16 Efﬁciency Heating, lighting GHGs Direct and embodied 5–15%
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be spent on other goods and services or saved/invested, and both of
these actions will necessarily be associated with energy use and
GHG emissions. While efﬁciency improvements lead to both direct
and indirect rebound effects, sufﬁciency measures only lead to
indirect effects.
• Energy versus emission rebound effects: Both direct and indirect
rebound effects may be estimated in terms of energy consumption,
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions or GHG emissions, but themagnitude
of those effects will differ in each case. As the carbon/GHG intensity of
energy systems changes over time, the relative magnitude of these
rebound effects will also change — and in some circumstances,
rebound effects may be found to be small in energy terms but large
in GHG terms, or vice versa.
• Direct versus embodied energy use and emissions: Households consume
signiﬁcant amounts of energy ‘directly’ in the form of electricity,1
heating fuels and vehicle fuels, but they also consume energy ‘indi-
rectly’, since energy is used at each stage of the supply chain for all
goods and services. This life-cycle energy use is commonly termed
embodied energywhile the associated emissions are termed embodied
emissions. While direct rebound effects typically relate to direct ener-
gy use and emissions, indirect rebound effects may derive from both
direct and embodied energy use and emissions. For example, the sav-
ings from an energy-efﬁcient heating or cooling systemmay be spent
upon more heating or cooling (direct rebound, direct emissions),
more lighting (indirect rebound, direct emissions) or more furniture
(indirect rebound, embodied emissions).
Table 1 uses the above categories to classify the limited number of
studies that estimate both direct and indirect rebound effects for house-
holds. These studies vary in the methodologies and economic models
employed, the categories used for classifying household expenditures,
the types of measure investigated, the rebound mechanisms captured
and the quantitative results obtained.While most focus upon improved
energy efﬁciency in electricity, heating or personal travel, others
examine sufﬁciency measures, such as reducing car travel or food
waste. Different studies estimate rebound effects in energy, CO2 and
GHG terms, but no study estimates and compares all three.
This diversity, combined with the methodological limitations of the
various studies (see Sorrell, 2010), the limited use of sensitivity tests
and the lack of systematic investigation make it difﬁcult to draw ﬁrm
conclusions. In particular, all but two of the studies estimate rebound ef-
fects for an ‘average’ household in the relevant countries and therefore
provide no information on how rebound effects vary between different
socio-economic groups. The exceptions areMurray (2013) who investi-
gates rebound effects from both efﬁciency and sufﬁciency measures for
different income groups in Australia, and Thomas and Azevedo
(2013) who do the same for the US. Both ﬁnd that rebound effects
are inversely related to household income and that embodied1 Emissions from electricity consumption are commonly labelled as direct, although
they occur at the power station.emissions form a larger proportion of the total rebound effect for
higher income households. Murray further observes that higher in-
come households have more scope for reducing the environmental
impacts of their consumption patterns, as well as the lowest rebound
effects from doing so.
This paper takes a similar approach toMurray (2013) for households
in theUK.We estimate direct and indirect rebound effects in GHG terms
following a range of efﬁciency and sufﬁciency measures by households
in ﬁve income groups (quintiles). We also extend the existing literature
by allowing for the capital cost of energy-efﬁcient equipment, the
emissions embodied in that equipment and the emissions associated
with both household savings and government expenditure of product
taxation revenues.
3. Methodology
3.1. Approach
This paper investigates ten widely advocated measures for reducing
GHG emissions from UK households. Seven of these are efﬁciency mea-
sures that require the purchase and installation of equipment, while
three are sufﬁciency measures that solely involve behavioural change
(Table 2). We estimate that all of the efﬁciency measures were cost ef-
fective at normal market discount rates for an average UK household
in 2009, although individual measures are not suitable for all house-
holds and the potential cost savings vary widely from one household
to another. Four of the efﬁciencymeasures were eligible for investment
subsidies under the UK Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) in
2009, with the size and availability of subsidies varying with the
socio-economic circumstances of the household (DECC, 2010b).
All but one of the measures are aimed at reducing household
consumption of electricity, heating fuels or vehicle fuels and hence are
expected to reduce the directGHG emissions associatedwith household
consumption. The exception is eliminating food waste which primarily
affects the embodied emissions associated with food consumption.
Both the measures themselves and the method for estimating re-
bound effects were previously described in Druckman et al. (2011)
and Chitnis et al. (2013). This paper extends this analysis by exploring
the variation in rebound effects between different income groups. The
method relies upon four sources of information:
• Estimates of the savings in energy use and emissions from undertak-
ing the efﬁciency measures in an ‘average’ UK dwelling, excluding
any rebound effects. The estimates for the domestic energy measures
(1–6 and 8) are derived from the Community Domestic Energy Model
(CDEM), a detailed engineering model of the English housing stock
(Firth et al., 2009). The corresponding estimates for the vehicle fuel
(7 and 9) and food (10) measures are summarised in Annex B.
• Estimates of the embodied GHG emissions associated with the rele-
vant energy efﬁciency equipment, such as insulation materials.
These are derived from a number of Life Cycle Analyses (LCA),
summarised in Chitnis et al. (2013).
3 Engel curves have been estimated using a wide range of functional forms which may
be more or less consistent with the data in different circumstances (Haque, 2005; Prais
and Houthakker, 1955). The chosen form should allow for saturation in demand for a cat-
egory as expenditure increases, as well as satisfying the ‘adding-up restriction’ (i.e. the
Table 2
Selected measures.
Type No. Measure Emissions targeted Energy service Subsidy
available
Efﬁciency measures 1 Insulating previously un-insulated cavity walls Direct Heating Yes
2 Topping up loft insulation to 270 mm Direct Heating Yes
3 Replacing existing boilers with condensing boilers Direct Heating No
4 Insulating hot water tanks to best practice (75 mm jacket) Direct Heating Yes
5 Replacing existing incandescent bulbs with compact ﬂuorescent bulbs (CFLs) Direct Lighting No
6 Replacing all existing lighting with LEDs Direct Lighting Yes
7 Replacing an existing car with an energy efﬁcient model Direct Car transport No
Sufﬁciency measures 8 Reducing average internal temperatures by one degree centigrade Direct Heating –
9 Eliminating all car journeys of less than two miles Direct Car transport –
10 Eliminating food waste Embodied Nutrition –
Combined measures 11 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 combined Direct Heating and lighting Yes
12 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 combined Direct Heating and lighting Yes
13 8, 9 and 10 combined Direct and embodied Heating, car transport and nutrition –
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household consumption of different categories of goods and services.
These are derived from the Surrey Environmental Lifestyle Mapping
Framework (SELMA), a quasi-multi-regional, environmentally extend-
ed input–output model that provides estimates of the GHG intensity
of UK household expenditure in each category (in tCO2e/£) for 2004
(Druckman and Jackson, 2008; Druckman et al., 2008).2
• Estimates of the expenditure elasticities of the 16 categories of
household goods and services for each of ﬁve income groups. These
are derived from econometric analysis of the 2009 UK Living Costs
and Food Survey (LCFS).
Section 3.2 summarises the method for estimating expenditure
elasticities, while Section 3.3 summarises the method for estimating
rebound effects.
3.2. Expenditure Model
To estimate rebound effects, it is necessary to estimate how the cost
savings from the measures will be re-spent on different categories
of goods and services. To model this we estimate the expenditure
elasticities of 16 categories of goods and services (i — Table 3) for ﬁve
different income groups, or quintiles (j — Table 4).
To calculate these elasticities, we estimate Engel curves for each cat-
egory of goods and services. Engel curves describe how the expenditure
on a particular category of goods or services varies with total expendi-
ture. Our data source for household expenditure is the 2009 edition of
the UK Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS). This uses a stratiﬁed
random sample of ~6000 households who are required to keep detailed
records of their expenditure over a two-week period, as well as provid-
ing further information on their purchases of large items over the
previous twelve months. Since income is not accurately recorded by
the LCFS, we use total household expenditure as a proxy and adjust
this with an equivalence scale so different households can be compared
(Lewbel, 1997). We use the ‘OECD modiﬁed equivalence scale’ which
calculates the equivalised expenditure (Xh) of a household (h) as follows:
Xh ¼
Zh
nh
ð1Þ
where Zh is the expenditure of household h and nh is the equivalised
household size, given by:
nh ¼ 1þ 0:5Ah þ 0:3Ch ð2Þ2 The GHG intensity of a category is estimated from the GHG emissions associatedwith
that category in 2004 (obtained from SELMA) divided by ‘real’ expenditure on that catego-
ry in 2004— taking 2009 as the reference year for real expenditure. The exception is elec-
tricity where emissions are estimated from 2009 electricity consumption (in kWh)
multiplied by an emission factor for 2009 (kg CO2e/kWh).where Ah is the number of additional householdmembers who are over
the age of 14 and Ch is the number of children below the age of 14. This
scale implies, for example, that a household with two adults and two
children needs more than twice the income (nh = 2.1) of a single
adult household (nh = 1.0) to achieve a comparable standard of living.
With these adjustments, the more accurate label for our ‘income
quintiles’ is ‘equivalised total expenditure quintiles’. Table 4 summa-
rises the mean equivalised household size and equivalised annual
expenditure in each quintile.
For simplicity we adopt the widely used Working-Leser (WL) form
for the Engel curves (Leser, 1963)3 and add the age of the ‘household
reference person’4 as an additional explanatory variable. The WL
function then takes the lin-log form:
Wi ¼ αi þ βi lnX þ γiHRP þ υi ð3Þ
where:
Wi ¼
Xi
X
: ð4Þ
Xi is the equivalised expenditure on category i; X is equivalised total
expenditure; Wi is the share of category i in total expenditure
(0 ≤Wi ≤ 1); HRP is the age of the household reference person; αi, βi
and γi are the unknown parameters; and υi is the random error term.
For theWLmodel, the adding-up restriction implies that:
X
i
αi ¼ 1 and
X
i
βi ¼ 0 ð5Þ
This is satisﬁed automatically when the model is estimated using
OLS. The expenditure elasticity of category i is given by:
εi ¼
∂Xi
∂X
X
Xi
¼ ∂ lnXi∂ lnX ð6Þsum of expenditures on each category must equal the total expenditure) and providing
the best statistical ﬁt. But single functional forms rarely satisfy all three requirements si-
multaneously, with the ﬁt frequently being poorer for extreme values of expenditure
(Haque, 2005).
4 Deﬁned as the person who pays themortgage or rent or, if this is paid jointly, the per-
son with the highest income.
Table 3
Categories of goods and services.
Category (i) COICOP category Description
1 1 Food & non-alcoholic beverages
2 2 Alcoholic beverages, tobacco, narcotics
3 3 Clothing & footwear
4 4.5.1 Electricity
5 4.5.2 Gas
6 4.5.3 and 4.5.4 Other fuels
7 4.1 to 4.4 Other housing
8 5 Furnishings, household equipment &
household maintenance
9 6 Health
10 7.2.2.2 Vehicle fuels and lubricants
11 Rest of 7 Other transport
12 8 Communication
13 9 Recreation & culture
14 10 Education
15 11 Restaurants & hotels
16 12 Miscellaneous goods & services
Notes: COICOP — Classiﬁcation of Individual Consumption According to Purpose. Other
housing includes rent, mortgage payments, maintenance, repair and water supply. Other
transport includes public transport, aviation and non-fuel expenditure on private vehicles.
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εi ¼
βi
Wi
þ 1 ð7Þ
When estimating elasticities for each quintile (ε i
j), this expression is
evaluated at the mean value of the expenditure share for that category
within each quintile (Wi
j):
ε ji ¼
βi
W ji
þ 1 ð8Þ
3.3. Rebound Model
Following Chitnis et al. (2013), we model the impact of each
measure on global GHG emissions as the net result of three different
effects which we term the engineering, embodied and income effects
respectively:
• Engineering effect (ΔH): Each efﬁciencymeasure is expected to reduce
the amount of energy required to deliver a given energy service
(e.g. heating, lighting, transport), while each sufﬁciency measure is
expected to reduce consumption of the relevant energy service. The
engineering effect represents the estimated reduction in GHG emissions
assuming that consumption of the energy service remains unchanged
for the efﬁciency measures and falls for the sufﬁciency measures.
• Embodied effect (ΔM): Efﬁciency measures require the manufacture
and installation of equipment (e.g. insulation materials) which is nec-
essarily associatedwithGHGemissions at different stages of the supplyTable 4
Mean equivalised household size and annual expenditure in each quintile.
Annual household
expenditure (Z j)
Equivalised household
size (n j)
Equivalised annual
household expenditure (X j)
Quintile 1 £6.8 k 1.46 £4.7 k
Quintile 2 £12.4 k 1.59 £7.8 k
Quintile 3 £17.3 k 1.65 £10.5 k
Quintile 4 £23.2 k 1.64 £14.1 k
Quintile 5 £40.3 k 1.64 £24.6 k
Mean £19.7 k 1.60 £12.3 k
Note: Based upon the 2009 Living Costs and Food Survey using the OECDmodiﬁed equiv-
alence scale.chain. These emissions are conventionally treated as ‘embodied’ in the
relevant equipment. The embodied effect represents the difference
between the embodied emissions associated with the measure and
those associated with the relevant alternative — which may be doing
nothing (e.g. for loft insulation), continuing to use existing equipment
or purchasing less energy efﬁcient equipment. Sufﬁciencymeasures do
not require additional equipment, so have no embodied effect.
• Income effect (ΔG): Both efﬁciency and sufﬁciency measures should
lead to reduced expenditure on the relevant energy service. The
resulting cost savingsmay be partly offset by the capital cost of the rel-
evant measure, but the net savings will be positive if averaged over a
period longer than the simple payback time. This ‘avoided’ expenditure
may be treated as analogous to an increase in household income since
it allows increased consumption of goods and services and/or in-
creased savings. The income effect is an estimate of the impact on global
GHGemissions of this increased consumption and savings. For efﬁcien-
cy measures the income effect includes increased consumption of the
energy service, while for sufﬁciency measures it does not.5
The estimated total impact (ΔQ) of each measure on global GHG
emissions is then given by:
ΔQ ¼ ΔH þ ΔM þ ΔG ð9Þ
In percentage terms, we deﬁne the rebound effect (RE) from each
measure as:
RE ¼ 100  ΔH−ΔQ
ΔH
 
: ð10Þ
Substituting for ΔQ from Eq. (9) gives
RE ¼−100  ΔGþ ΔM
ΔH
 
: ð11Þ
This deﬁnition treats the embodied effect as offsetting some of the
anticipated GHG savings from the measure and thereby contributing
to the rebound effect. An alternative approach, which is not used here,
would be to subtract the embodied effect from the anticipated GHG
savings (Chitnis et al., 2013).
In implementing this approach, we assume that each measure is
undertaken by all eligible6 UK households in 2009 (t= 1). We estimate
the corresponding impact on global GHG emissions over a period of T
years (t = 1 to T) where T is less than the economic lifetime of the
energy efﬁciency measures. For simplicity, we present all our results
for a ten-year period (T = 10) and hold the variables affecting GHG
emissions ﬁxed over this period. A different choice of time period
would modify the results. We take 2009 as the reference year for all
‘real’ values and estimate each effect on an equivalised basis.
We estimate the engineering (ΔHt
j), embodied (ΔMt
j) and income
(ΔGt
j) effects for each quintile and year using the mean value of total
equivalised expenditure (Wj) and household composition (nj) within
each quintile (assumed to be ﬁxed over period T). We then estimate
the rebound effect for households in each quintile averaged over a
period of T years (RE j) as follows:
RE j ¼−100
XT
t¼1
ΔGjt þ ΔMjt
h i
XT
t¼1
ΔHjt
2
66664
3
77775: ð12Þ5 Murray (2013) criticises Druckman et al. (2011) for allowing re-spending on the cat-
egories that are the target of the sufﬁciency measure(s). But this is incorrect. Druckman
et al do not allow this form of re-spending and we do not do so here.
6 Not all households are eligible for eachmeasure. For example a dwelling without cav-
ity walls cannot have cavity wall insulation.
8 An alternative approach would be to model household savings as deferred consump-
tion. In either case, the purpose of including savings is to explicitly highlight their conse-
quences for GHG emissions.
9 Environmentally-Extended Input–Output (IO)models such as SELMAonly include the
GHG emissions associated with each expenditure category. But expenditures on different
commodities include various taxes (such as Value Added Tax — VAT) which in turn are
used to fund government expenditure. Since government spending is a separate category
in the national accounts, the associatedGHGemissions are normally excluded from the es-
timated GHG intensities of household expenditure. Exclusion of these emissions could bias
estimates of the rebound effect, in particular because differing levels of product taxation
are applied to different goods and services. For example, in the UK there is 20% VAT on
most goods and services; 5% VAT on electricity, gas and other fuels; zero rate VAT onmost
food products; and around 65% taxation on vehicle fuels. To eliminate this potential bias
we: ﬁrst, estimate the GHG intensity of UK government expenditure in the base year; sec-
ond, use this to estimate theGHG emissions associatedwith taxation in each category; and
third, add these to the emissionsprovidedby SELMA for each expenditure category. This in
turn leads to an adjusted GHG intensity of expenditure for each category which is used in
the calculation of rebound effects. As the GHG intensity of government expenditure is rel-
atively low, this adjustment does not signiﬁcantly change our estimates of rebound effects.
10 White test showed that heteroskedasticity could not be rejected for all the estimated
Engel curves. Hence, White heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator was used to correct
the standard errors for heteroskedasticity.
11 We also estimated theDouble Semi-Log (DSL) functional form:X = λ + θX+φ lnX+
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average internal temperatures could lead to signiﬁcant variations in
the embodied and engineering effects between quintiles, we lack the
data to model these explicitly. Instead, we model differences in the en-
gineering effect by allowing for differences in the equivalised expendi-
ture on energy commodities by each quintile.
Annex A describes the estimation of the engineering, embodied and
income effects in detail.
4. Assumptions
In this section and inAnnexB,we summarise someof the assumptions
used when estimating these effects for each measure and quintile. Many
of the relevant assumptions are summarised in Druckman et al. (2011)
and Chitnis et al. (2013), so only the key points are highlighted here.
4.1. Assumptions for the Engineering Effect
We use the CDEM to estimate the percentage energy savings by fuel
type from the domestic energymeasures (1–6 and 8 in Table 2) (Chitnis
et al., 2013). These relate to an ‘average’UKhousehold and allow for the
fact that somemeasures (e.g. cavitywall insulation) are only suitable for
a subset of households. The relevant assumptions for the other
measures are summarised in Annex B.
To obtain estimates of the GHG savings from each measure for each
quintile (ΔH t
j) we use the above to adjust our estimates of the GHG emis-
sions associatedwith the relevant expenditure categories for eachquintile
(H lt
j where l= electricity, gas, other fuels, vehicle fuels or food and non-
alcoholic beverages). The latter in turn are estimated from the product of
equivalised expenditures (X lt
j
— in £) and the GHG intensity of
expenditure (ult— in tCO2e/£) for each quintile and expenditure category.
This approach ensures that our estimates of the engineering effect vary
between quintiles and are consistent with our estimates of the income
effect which are derived in a similar way (see Table A.1).
4.2. Assumptions for the Embodied Effect
Estimates of the incremental embodied emissions for each measure
are summarised in Table A.2. These represent the difference between
the embodied emissions of the measure and those associated with the
relevant counterfactual. Sufﬁciency measures involve no equipment,
so have no embodied emissions. The assumptions for the domestic
energy measures (1–6) are taken from a number of LCA studies,
summarised in Chitnis et al. (2013). For the lighting measures, we as-
sume that the counterfactual involves the continued use of traditional,
incandescent bulbs.
In the UK, the emissions embodied within an average new car
typically account for 16–24% of its total life cycle emissions (Carbon
Trust, 2011).7 We assume that only cars at the end of their natural life
are scrapped and that they are replaced by a fuel-efﬁcient diesel rather
than an average new car. Embodied emissions will form a greater
proportion of total lifecycle emissions for the latter, but may be smaller
in absolute terms and could therefore lead to a negative embodied
effect. But in the absence of more accurate data, we assume that the
embodied effect is zero for this measure.
4.3. Assumptions for the Income Effect
Estimates of the income effect require assumptions about the
equivalised cost savings (ΔXt
j) and capital cost (ΔKt
j) associated with
each measure for each quintile, the GHG intensity of expenditure in7 As a consequence, scrapping an existing car before the end of its natural life and re-
placing it with a fuel-efﬁcient model may lead to little or no emission reductions, even if
driving patterns remain unchanged.each category (uit) and the expenditure elasticity of those categories
for each quintile (ε i
j).
Estimates of the cost savings from the domestic energy measures are
derived using the CDEM and data on domestic energy prices in 2009
(Chitnis et al., 2013). Estimates for the other measures rely upon simpler
calculations, described in Annex B. This Annex also summarises our as-
sumptions for the capital cost of each measure both with and without
the subsidies provided by the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT).
Estimates of the GHG intensity of household expenditure in 2009
(uit) are derived from SELMA, with additional adjustments to allow for
the emissions associated with household savings and for government
expenditure of product taxation revenues. For the former, we assume
the average household saves and invests 15% of their annual income,
and that the GHG intensity of this investment is comparable to the UK
average.8 For the latter, we estimate the GHG emissions associated
with spending the revenue from product taxes in each category and
add these to the emissions provided by SELMA.9
Fig. 1 (top) shows that expenditure on electricity, gas, other fuels
and vehicle fuels is approximately three times as GHG intensive as
expenditure on the other categories and ﬁve times as intensive as the
share-weighted mean (see also Table A.5). But for an average house-
hold, the high GHG intensity of energy commodities is offset by their
small share of total expenditure (Fig. 1, middle), with the result that
direct energy consumption only accounts for 41% of an average
household's ‘GHG footprint’ (Fig. 1, bottom), split between 29% domes-
tic energy (i.e. electricity, gas and other fuels) and 12% vehicle fuels. As
discussed below, these proportions vary signiﬁcantly between quintiles.
The category providing the largest single contribution to total emissions
for an average household is food and non-alcoholic beverages (14%).
Our estimates of GHG intensities allow for the variation of product
taxation between categories: namely VAT exemption for food and
non-alcoholic beverages, lower rate VAT for domestic energy and high
taxation of vehicle fuels (~60% of retail price). The latter contributes to
the comparatively low GHG intensity of vehicle fuels compared to
domestic energy.
Table 5 summarises the estimated expenditure elasticities for each
category and quintile (ε i
j
), while Table A.7 summarises the estimated
Engel curves.10 The coefﬁcient of log equivalised total expenditure (βi)
was found to be signiﬁcant at the 5% level for all categories, while that
for the age of the household reference person (γi) was signiﬁcant for
all but one category. Despite the low adjusted R2, the WL speciﬁcation
provided a better ﬁt than alternative functional forms.11i i i i
ρiHRP+ ωi —where λi, θi, φi and ρi are parameters and ωi is the error term (Haque, 2005).
This gave comparable elasticities to theWL over the whole sample, but the differences were
more pronounced for individual quintiles. Since theDSL estimation resultswere less satisfac-
tory in termsof statistical signiﬁcance andexpected signs,weonly report theWL results here.
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Fig. 1. GHG intensity of expenditure, share of total expenditure and share of total GHG emissions by category for an average household.
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Fig. 2. Estimated engineering, embodied and income effects (ignoring capital cost) for an
average household (percentage of baseline emissions).
Table 5
Estimated expenditure elasticities by quintile in 2009.
Category Quintile Mean
1 2 3 4 5
Food & non-alcoholic beverages 0.65 0.57 0.48 0.38 0.06 0.39
Alcoholic beverages & tobacco 0.71 0.68 0.65 0.60 0.45 0.59
Clothing & footwear 1.51 1.34 1.32 1.27 1.28 1.30
Electricity 0.57 0.37 0.17 0.00 −0.62 0.05
Gas 0.62 0.49 0.34 0.15 −0.25 0.23
Other fuels 0.85 0.77 0.82 0.79 0.69 0.77
Other housing 0.73 0.73 0.68 0.68 0.56 0.66
Furnishings 1.60 1.56 1.44 1.40 1.30 1.38
Health 1.82 1.69 1.59 1.50 1.38 1.48
Vehicle fuels & lubricants 1.20 1.13 1.12 1.13 1.17 1.14
Other transport 2.31 1.80 1.61 1.52 1.40 1.52
Communication 0.63 0.54 0.47 0.39 0.06 0.38
Recreation & culture 1.39 1.37 1.31 1.30 1.23 1.28
Education 9.96 5.63 3.97 2.37 1.47 1.90
Restaurants & hotels 1.34 1.27 1.24 1.22 1.22 1.23
Miscellaneous goods & services 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.09 1.09 1.09
18 M. Chitnis et al. / Ecological Economics 106 (2014) 12–32Food, drink and domestic energy were found to be expenditure
inelastic for all quintiles, (ε i
j b 1), as was communication and other
housing (Table 5). All other categories were found to be expenditure
elastic (ε i
j b 1). The elasticity of most categories of expenditure fell as
equivalised total expenditure increased, although to varying degrees
and more steeply for necessities (deﬁned here as ε i
j b 1). The elasticities
for electricity and gas were estimated to be negative for Q5— suggesting,
rather surprisingly, that energy is an inferior good for these households.
However, the assumed values for these elasticities have only a small
impact on the estimated rebound effects.5. Results
This section presents our estimates of the rebound effects from the
different measures for each quintile, averaged over a period of ten
years. To illuminate thedrivers of these results,weﬁrst discuss themag-
nitude of the engineering, embodied and income effects for an average
household and then summarise how the quintiles differ in terms of
equivalised expenditure, GHG emissions and average GHG intensity of
expenditure. We then present the estimated rebound effects for each
quintile in two stages, namely: a) income effects only, ignoring capital
costs; and b) income and embodied effects, allowing for capital
costs (with and without the CERT subsidies). Section 6 discusses the
implications.5.1. Estimated Effects for an Average Household
Fig. 2 and Table A.6 summarise our estimates of the engineering,
embodied and income effects for each measure as a percentage of base-
line emissions for an average UK household. The corresponding effects
for each quintile may depart signiﬁcantly from these values.
The results suggest that, ignoring rebound effects, the combined
adoption of the efﬁciency measures could reduce the total ‘GHG
footprint’ of an average UK household by ~3.8% while the combined
adoption of the sufﬁciency measures could reduce emissions by a com-
parable amount.12 The measures with the largest single impact (~1.5%)
are reducing internal temperatures and reducing foodwaste, in part be-
cause these are available to all households and affect the categorieswith
the largest share of total emissions. For those measures that are only12 The emission savings from combining measures may not be additive — for example,
installing insulation reduces the savings achievable from reducing internal temperatures,
while installing energy-efﬁcient lighting leads to an additional demand for heating fuels in
order to compensate for the lost heat from traditional lightbulbs. We use the CDEM to
model these effects.suitable for a subset of households (e.g. cavity wall insulation), the
percentage reductions for adopting households will be higher.
Fig. 2 compares the relative size of the income and embodied effects
for the efﬁciencymeasures. Averaged across allmeasures, the embodied
effect is only 13% of the income effect. However, the embodied effect is
more important for loft insulation and LED lighting—which both have a
lifetime that considerably exceeds the ten year period considered here.
Fig. 3 illustrates the estimated contribution of each category to the
income effect for combined measures 1–4 and 6, ignoring capital
costs. The relative share of each category depends upon the product of
its GHG intensity, expenditure share and expenditure elasticity. So de-
spite beingGHG intensive, the three domestic energy categories provide
only a small (7.1% total) contribution to the income effect owing to their
small share of total expenditure and low expenditure elasticity for an
average household (Fig. 2).
5.2. Variation of Expenditures and Emissions between Quintiles
Fig. 4 shows the split of equivalised expenditures by category and
quintile. There is a fairly linear increase in total expenditure from Q1
to Q4, butwithQ5 expenditures being disproportionately high, suggest-
ing a long tail of very high spending households. Q1 households spend
less than half as much on necessities13 as Q5, but these form a much
larger share of their total budget (57% versus 27%). For those necessities
with a high GHG intensity (i.e. electricity, gas, other fuels, food & non-
alcoholic beverages), the corresponding ﬁgures are 36% for Q1 and
13% for Q5. In contrast, Q1 households spend only 4% of their budget
on other transport, while Q5 households spend 13% — or 17 times as
much in absolute terms.
Fig. 5 plots GHG emissions against total expenditure, while Fig. 6
shows the breakdown of equivalised GHG emissions for each quintile.
Emissions are correlated with expenditure, but the average GHG
intensity of expenditure falls as total expenditure increases (Fig. 7).
For example, spending by Q1 households is 16.3% more GHG intensive
than spending by Q5 households. A similar pattern is observed with
marginal expenditureswhich are ~19% less GHG intensive than average
expenditures (Fig. 7). This pattern suggests that total GHG emissions
may not increase at the same rate as incomes increase, but income
redistribution may increase aggregate emissions.
Since necessities are comparatively GHG intensive, low-income
households have disproportionately high emissions relative to expendi-
ture. Fig. 8 shows that embodied emissions aremore strongly correlated
with total expenditure than direct emissions, with the correlation being13 Deﬁned here as those categories whose estimated expenditure elasticity is less than
unity: i.e. electricity, gas, other fuels, food & non-alcoholic beverages, alcoholic beverages
and tobacco, other housing and communications.
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Fig. 3. Contribution of different categories to the income effect for an average household (measures 1–4 and 6 combined).
19M. Chitnis et al. / Ecological Economics 106 (2014) 12–32weakest for domestic energy emissions. Hence,while total emissions for
Q5 households are four and half times larger than Q1 households, their
domestic energy emissions are only 60% larger while their embodied
emissions are more than six times larger. Saunders (2013) ﬁnds a
similar distribution for US households.5.3. Rebound Effects from Income Effects Alone
Table 6 summarises our estimates of the rebound effect for each
measure for an average household. These estimates relate to the income
effect alone; in other words, ignoring the embodied effect and capital
cost of the efﬁciency measures. As with our earlier work (Chitnis et al.,
2013), the results show that rebound effects for the domestic energy
measures are broadly comparable and relatively modest — with all
estimates converging around 14–15%. The primary reason these effects
aremodest is thatmost of the re-spending is on goods and serviceswith
a much lower GHG intensity than domestic energy itself. The rebound
effects for heating and lighting are comparable in size because, in our
model, expenditure on electricity is approximately as GHG intensive
as expenditure on heating fuels. However, this result is contingent
upon the fuel mix in electricity generation in 2009. As Chitnis et al.
(2013) observe, the transition towards a low carbon electricity system
in the UK will increase the (GHG) rebound effect from electricity
efﬁciency measures — with those effects potentially exceeding 100%
by 2030.14
Again conﬁrming our earlier work (Druckman et al., 2011), the
rebound effects for the vehicle and food measures are found to be
much larger: namely 46% for the efﬁcient car, 28% for reducing car use
and 77% for eliminating food waste. In these cases, reduced consump-
tion of vehicle fuels and food leads to relatively modest GHG savings
and relatively high cost savings. These cost savings are then spent14 UK electricity generators are participating in the EU ETS and hence are covered by an
EU wide carbon cap. In this context, any actions that reduce carbon emissions from UK
electricity generators, including improvements in household electricity efﬁciency, will
not reduce global carbon emissions at all. This is because such actions will simply free
up allowances that could be used by other participants in the EU ETS to cover either in-
creases in emissions or reduced emissions abatement (Sorrell and Sijm, 2003). Alterna-
tively, the allowances may be banked and used in subsequent trading periods, but they
will still ultimately be used to cover emissions. Hence, from this perspective, the engineer-
ing effect of electricity efﬁciency improvements is zerowhile the EU ETS cap is in place. As
a result, improvements in electricity efﬁciency already increase aggregate GHG emissions
as a consequence of the embodied and income effects.upon other goods and services that have a comparable GHG intensity,
leading to a large income effect relative to the engineering effect and
hence a high rebound effect.
For the efﬁcient car, the cost savings on vehicle fuels are supple-
mented by the cost savings on vehicle excise duty which ampliﬁes the
rebound effect. This demonstrates howmeasures that achieve cost sav-
ings in more than one category, as well as measures that are subsidised
in someway,may be associatedwith larger rebound effects. However, a
full accounting of the GHG implications of subsidies would need to
consider their source (e.g. taxation) and the corresponding implications
for economic activity and emissions.
While reducing food waste has the largest technical potential to
reduce emissions, it is also the measure with the largest rebound effect
(77%). As a result, the net contribution to emission reductions from this
measure is less than a quarter of its technical potential and only one
tenth of the contribution from the domestic energymeasures combined
(Table A.6).
Table 6 also indicates the contribution of direct emissions to the es-
timated rebound effect for each measure. These numbers set an upper
limit for the direct rebound effect for the efﬁciency measures, since a
signiﬁcant proportion of these emissions derive from increased
consumption of the relevant energy service.15 The results show that,
on average, direct emissions contribute only ~19% of the rebound
effect— in other words, the bulk of the rebound effects in ourmodel de-
rive from the emissions embodied in non-energy goods and services.
Moreover, a large (~40%) and growingproportion of these occur outside
the UK (Druckman and Jackson, 2009; Wiedmann et al., 2008).
Fig. 9 shows how the estimated rebound effects vary between quin-
tiles. Two important observations may be made. First, rebound effects
decline as total expenditures increase and are therefore signiﬁcantly
larger for low-income households. For example, the estimated rebound
effect frommeasures 1–5 in combination is 20.1% for Q1 households but
only 12.6% for Q5. This pattern also applies to the sufﬁciency measures,
but is less pronounced when these measures are combined — largely15 The direct rebound effect is zero for the sufﬁciencymeasures since re-spending in the
relevant categories is disallowed. Also, our methodology does not permit the straightfor-
ward isolation of the direct rebound effect for the domestic energy measures owing to
the way different energy carriers are treated. So for example, we model the income effect
for electricity consumption following the installation of energy-efﬁcient lighting, but we
cannot easily distinguish between increased use of electricity for lighting and increased
use of electricity for other purposes — including heating.
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Fig. 4. Equivalised expenditure by category and quintile (2009).
20 M. Chitnis et al. / Ecological Economics 106 (2014) 12–32because re-spending on food, domestic energy and vehicle fuels is
disallowed.
Second, direct emissions form a much larger proportion of the total
rebound effect for low-income households. For example, for measures
1–5 in combination, direct emissions form ~45.0% of the income effect
for Q1 households but only ~7.2% for Q5. Since GHG-intensive necessi-
ties form a larger share of total expenditure for low-incomehouseholds,
as well as having a proportionately higher expenditure elasticity, they
account for a larger proportion of total re-spending. The reverse is the
case for high income households where almost all the rebound effect
derives from embodied emissions. This indicates that conﬁning
attention to direct emissions would lead to an overestimate of emission
savings, especially for high income households.
Low income households may be expected to have the strongest
ﬁnancial motivation to reduce food waste, but our results suggest that
this measure could lead to a net increase in emissions (‘backﬁre’). Inpractice, the actual GHG savings will be sensitive to the particular
commodity choices made. For example, vegetarian households would
have lower GHG savings from reducing foodwaste since their diet is ap-
proximately 22% less GHG intensive (Berners-Lee et al., 2012). If such
households were to achieve comparable cost savings from reducing
food waste, then backﬁre would be a likely outcome. But since vegetar-
ian food tends to be cheaper, the cost savings and hence the income
effect is also likely to be lower.
5.4. Rebound Effects Taking into Account the Capital Cost and Embodied
Emissions of the Efﬁciency Measures
Allowing for capital costs and the embodied effect modiﬁes our esti-
mates of the rebound effect for the efﬁciency measures, but in opposite
ways. Allowing for capital costs reduces the estimated cost savings over
a given time period and therefore reduces the estimated rebound effect,
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Fig. 5. GHG emissions versus total expenditure for the sample of households.
21M. Chitnis et al. / Ecological Economics 106 (2014) 12–32while allowing for the emissions embodied in themeasures themselves
increases the rebound effect (with our deﬁnition). The net effect varies
between measures and quintiles and with the time period considered.
Table 7 summarises the net result for an average household over our
ten year time period, with and without the CERT subsidies (DECC,
2010b). With subsidies (column 5), the estimated rebound effect is
higher than that from the income effect alone for most of themeasures.
The exceptions are tank insulation and LED lighting where the capital
cost of themeasure erodes the rebound effect bymore than the embod-
ied effect increases it over the ten-year period— although a longer time
period would generate a different result. When households face the full
capital costs of eachmeasure (column 4), the rebound effects are gener-
ally reduced.16
Fig. 10 shows how the estimated rebound effects for the efﬁciency
measures vary between quintiles, both with and without allowing for
subsidies (CFLs are not subsidised). The pattern is broadly similar to
Fig. 9 except for unsubsidised loft insulation and LED lighting where re-
bound effects are found to increase with total expenditure. Both these
measures are relatively costly and for low income households, whose
expenditure on domestic energy is smaller in absolute terms than for
high income households, the capital cost signiﬁcantly offset the energy
cost savings. This picture would change if the rebound effects were
calculated over a longer time period. Also, the variance in emissions
both within and between quintiles (Fig. 5) makes it likely that rebound
effects will vary widely from one household to another.6. Discussion
The main conclusions of the above analysis are as follows. First, re-
bound effects appear to be fairlymodest (0–32%) for measures affecting
domestic energy use, larger (25–65%) for measures affecting vehicle
fuel use and very large (66–106%) for measures that reduce food
waste. Second, indirect rebound effects contributemost to these results,16 In practice, only a portion of households beneﬁt from subsidies and these are funded
through higher energy bills for all household consumers (Sorrell et al., 2009b). For exam-
ple, DECC (2010a) estimates that CERT raised household gas prices by 2.8% in 2010 and
household electricity prices by 3.3%. These energy price increases will reduce real house-
hold incomes and expenditures and hence reduce both energy-related and total GHG
emissions. As a result, the positive income effect from the energy efﬁciency improvements
will be offset by a negative income effect from the energy price rises — for both partici-
pants and non-participants in CERT (Sorrell et al., 2009b). To properly account for this, it
would be necessary to estimate theproportional contribution of eachmeasure to the over-
all increase in energy prices.with the overall effect being dominated by the embodied emissions of
non-energy goods and services. Third, rebound effects are generally
larger for low-income households—mainly because they spend a great-
er proportion of their cost savings on GHG-intensive necessities such as
food and drink. Fourth, direct emissions form a much larger proportion
of the total reboundeffect for low-incomehouseholds. Finally,measures
that achieve cost savings inmore than one category, aswell asmeasures
that are subsidised in someway,may be associatedwith larger rebound
effects (although the source of the subsidies must also be taken into
account). We ﬁrst discuss the robustness of these ﬁndings and then
highlight some relevant implications.
6.1. Robustness of the Results
Some uncertainty is created by the poor coverage of some expendi-
ture categories by the LCFS (e.g. durable goods) and our use of GHG in-
tensities that date from 2004, but these should not bias our results. Also,
we improve upon earlier studies by allowing for the emissions associat-
ed with government spending of product taxation revenues and the
variation in that taxation between product categories.
Our use of only 16 categories of household expenditure obscures the
variations in the price, quality and GHG intensity of goods within each
expenditure category and implicitly assumes that all households pur-
chase the same priced goods (Girod and de Haan, 2009). If, as seems
likely, high income households purchase higher-priced goods (at least
in some categories), our methodology could overestimate their expen-
diture elasticities. Similarly, if low-income households purchase
lower-priced goods, ourmethodology could underestimate their expen-
diture elasticities. This in turn would bias our results.
In practice, however, the potential size and direction of this bias is
difﬁcult to assess. For example, low income households in the UK typi-
cally pay higher prices for domestic energy, since they are more likely
to use prepayment meters and less likely to either pay by direct debit
or to switch suppliers. As a result, our methodology may overestimate
energy-related emissions for those households and hence overestimate
the engineering savings from efﬁciency improvements. At the same
time, it may underestimate the cost savings from such measures and
hence underestimate the income effect. In combination, this implies
that we may be underestimating the rebound effect for low-income
households. More generally the GHG intensity of different goods within
each category may vary widely and these variations may or may not be
correlated with the prices of those goods. This in turn could contribute
towide variations in theGHGemissions of householdswith comparable
17 This potential source of bias may help explain the differences between our results and
several studies of direct rebound effects from improved insulation (Boardman and Milne,
2000; Guertin et al., 2003; Nesbakken, 2001; Sanders and Philipson, 2006). These often
ﬁnd that low-income households have larger rebound effects since they are further from
satiation in their consumption of heating services (Hong et al., 2006; Madlener and
Hauertmann, 2011; Sorrell, 2007). In particular, many UK households live in excessively
cold conditions and take much of the beneﬁt of such improvements in the form of in-
creased comfort rather than lower bills (Sanders and Philipson, 2006). While our study
conﬁrms the general ﬁnding of higher direct rebound effects for such groups, our esti-
mates appear relatively low— indeed, our estimates of the total rebound effect from these
measures are lower than some estimates of the direct rebound effect alone. This may be
because our methodology only captures a subset of the relevant mechanisms.
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
Qu
inti
le 1
Qu
inti
le 2
Qu
inti
le 3
Qu
inti
le 4
Qu
inti
le 5 Al
l
Investment
Other transport
Vehicle fuels emission
Other Housing
Other fuels
Gas
Electricity
Miscellaneous goods & services
Restaurants & hotels
Education
Recreation & culture
Communication
Health
Furnishings
Clothing & footwear
Alcoholic beverages, tobacco, narcotics
Food & non-alcoholic beverages
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Qui
ntil
e 1
Qui
ntil
e 2
Qui
ntil
e 3
Qui
ntil
e 4
Qui
ntil
e 5 All
Sh
ar
e 
of
 G
H
G
 e
m
is
si
on
s 
(%
)
Investment
Other transport
Vehicle fuels emission
Other Housing
Other fuels
Gas
Electricity
Miscellaneous goods & services
Restaurants & hotels
Education
Recreation & culture
Communication
Health
Furnishings
Clothing & footwear
Alcoholic beverages, tobacco, narcotics
Food & non-alcoholic beverages
A
nn
ua
l e
qu
iv
al
is
ed
 G
H
G
 e
m
is
si
on
s 
(k
gC
O
2e
)
Fig. 6. Equivalised GHG emissions by category and quintile (2009).
22 M. Chitnis et al. / Ecological Economics 106 (2014) 12–32levels of expenditure. The manner in which such factors affect rebound
effects deserves further exploration.
A key limitation of this study is that we only capture the income ef-
fects of energy efﬁciency improvements and not the substitution effects.
To appreciate this distinction, consider a household that installs loft in-
sulation and recovers the capital costs over ten years through lower
heating bills. The incomeeffect is zero over this period, since thebill sav-
ings exactly offset the capital costs. Assuming, for illustration, that the
embodied effect is zero as well, our methodology would estimate a
zero rebound effect over this period (and a negative rebound effect for
periods less than 10 years). But since the unit cost of heating has fallen
relative to that of other goods and services, the household is likely to
consume more heating and fewer goods and services that are ‘substi-
tutes’ to heating. At the same time, the household may consume more
of other goods and services that are ‘complements’ to heating. The net
result will be a shift in consumption patterns and hence a change in
the household's total GHG emissions. In practice, we would expect sub-
stitution towards heating and away from other goods and services and
since the former is more GHG intensive than the latter, the net resultis likely to be an increase in GHG emissions and hence a positive re-
bound effect. More generally, the rebound effect will be given by the
sum of income and substitution effects for all commodities and is likely
to be greater than that from income effects alone. Hence, by neglecting
substitution effects, we suspect ourmethodologymay be systematically
underestimating rebound effects.17
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Table 6
Estimated rebound effects for an average household — income effects alone, ignoring
capital costs.
No. Measure Rebound
effect (%)
Contribution of direct emissions
to the rebound effect (% of total)
1 Cavity wall insulation 14.5 20.4
2 Loft insulation 14.5 20.4
3 Condensing boiler 15.2 20.4
4 Tank insulation 14.6 20.4
5 CFLs 15.3 29.0
6 LEDs 15.2 20.4
7 Efﬁcient car 46.4 20.4
8 Temperature reduction 13.7 16.6
9 Car use reduction 28.1 8.5
10 Food waste reduction 77.4 24.1
11 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 14.8 20.4
12 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 14.8 20.4
13 8, 9 and 10 35.5 2.7
24 M. Chitnis et al. / Ecological Economics 106 (2014) 12–32A second limitation derives from our use of a static input–output
model that neglects price changes and relies upon numerous simplify-
ing assumptions such as constant returns to scale and Leontief (ﬁxed
proportions) production functions. As a consequence, we cannot
capture any supply-side responses to improved energy efﬁciency
which may modify the size of the estimated effects. For example,
reduced energy demand may lower energy prices, thereby triggering
increased consumption and larger rebound effects. Alternatively, such
reductionsmay lead to ‘disinvestment’ in the upstream energy industry
which may contribute to smaller rebound effects (Anson and Turner,
2009). The use of CGE models to more fully capture such mechanisms
should be a priority for future research. However, input–output models
have the advantage of simplicity and transparency and can still deliver
useful insights — particularly when the use of a multiregional frame-
work permits accurate estimation of the emissions embodied in traded
goods.
Related to this, there has been some debate in the literature re-
garding the appropriate measure of the ‘engineering effect’ in this
type of study (Turner, 2013). Speciﬁcally, Guerra and Sancho
(2010) argue that this should include both direct emissions and the
emissions embodied in the intermediate inputs to the energy supply
sectors. As described in Annex 1, our approach is consistent with
Guerra and Sancho's recommendations since both engineering and
income effects are estimated on a consistent basis using our input
output model.6.2. Implications of the Results
Our results demonstrate the importance of accounting for rebound
effects within policy appraisals. This applies across the board, but is
particularly important for low income groups for whom rebound effects
are generally larger. Our results also demonstrate that both direct and
indirect rebound effects need to be accounted for. This is especially
important for high income groups who have a higher proportion of re-
bound as embodied emissions, much of which occurs beyond national
borders. Failure to take account of these effects in policy appraisals
will lead to an overestimate of energy and emission savings, in some
cases by a signiﬁcant amount. Also, the variation in the nature and
scale of rebound effects between income groups should be considered
when policies are targeted.
Our results also have implications for the design of carbon pricing
schemes. Such schemes need to incentivise efﬁciency improvements
and behavioural change,while at the same timemitigating any associat-
ed rebound effects and protecting low-income groups. This is best
achieved by economy-wide schemes with revenue recycling that incor-
porate border carbon adjustments to capture the emissions embodied
in traded goods (Monjon and Quirion, 2010; van Asselt and Brewer,2010). Our results demonstrate that expenditure by low-income house-
holds is comparatively GHG intensive while their total GHG emissions
are dominated by domestic energy (Fig. 8). This suggests that carbon
pricing conﬁned to domestic energy could be regressive without
carefully targeted compensation. Such a scheme would also fail to cap-
ture the bulk of emissions from high-income households, the majority
of which are embodied in the goods and services they consume.
The case for economy-wide carbon pricing is reinforced by the
observation that taxing energy commodities leads to larger rebound
effects. Speciﬁcally, we found that measures affecting vehicle fuels led
to larger rebound effects than measures affecting domestic energy, pri-
marily because the former were more heavily taxed. High taxation
means that a unit reduction in consumption leads to greater cost savings
and re-spending of those cost savings leads to a larger rebound effect.
The paradox is that higher taxation also provides a stronger incentive
to reduce consumption of energy commodities and hence to reduce
the associated direct emissions. The net impact will depend upon a
number of variables including the own price elasticity of the relevant
energy commodities, the GHG intensity of expenditure on that
commodity relative to other goods and services and any supply-side
responses.
This problem may be reduced if the carbon taxation was economy-
wide. This would raise the price of all goods and services in proportion
to their carbon intensity, and thereby lower theGHG intensity of expen-
diture (in tCO2e/£) of those goods and services. It would also provide in-
centives to reduce both household emissions and the GHG emissions
associated withmanufactured goods. The net result should be to reduce
the size of the indirect rebound effect — although the precise implica-
tions require investigation with a macroeconomic model. But to be
fully effective such a scheme would also need to capture the emissions
embodied in imported goods. While mechanisms such as border car-
bon adjustments are feasible, they present considerable legal and
practical challenges and may capture only small proportion of the
relevant emissions. Ultimately, this form of ‘carbon leakage’ can
only be adequately addressed through the development of interna-
tional climate agreements that cover a signiﬁcant proportion of glob-
al emissions.
Carbon pricing is not the only means to mitigate rebound effects
however. The wide variation in GHG emissions between households
with comparable levels of expenditure (Fig. 5) indicates the poten-
tial for voluntarily shifting consumption patterns towards lower car-
bon options — such as reducing air travel or putting savings towards
low carbon investments. While all the measures considered here are
necessarily associated with rebound effects, the magnitude of these
effects may vary widely from one household to another depending
upon their particular pattern of re-spending. Hence, existing
policy approaches that target barriers to energy efﬁciency could use-
fully be complemented by parallel measures that incentivise and
facilitate households in making lower carbon choices in all areas of
consumption.
Finally, it is essential to recognise that all of themeasures considered
here will improve consumer welfare and (except in particular cases)
reduce aggregate emissions. Hence, such measures should continue to
be encouraged.What needs to change are our estimates of the emission
reductions that such measures will achieve.
7. Summary
This study adds to a small but growing volume of evidence that esti-
mates combined direct and indirect rebound effects for households. Our
modelling indicates that such effects are modest (0–32%) for measures
affecting domestic energy use by UK households, larger (25–65%) for
measures affecting vehicle fuel use and very large (66–106%) for mea-
sures that reduce food waste. Our approach only captures a subset of
the relevant mechanisms and may underestimate the total effect. We
also ﬁnd that measures undertaken by low income households are
25M. Chitnis et al. / Ecological Economics 106 (2014) 12–32associatedwith larger rebound effects andmeasures that are subsidised
or affect highly taxed energy commodities may be less effective in re-
ducing aggregate emissions. While the results do not undermine theCavity wall insulation
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A.1. Estimating the Engineering Effect
Weestimate the engineering effect of the domestic energymeasures
(1–6 and 8) with the help of the CDEM. This simulates the energy
28 M. Chitnis et al. / Ecological Economics 106 (2014) 12–32consumption of the English dwelling stock through modelling the
behaviour of 47 different dwelling types. We ﬁrst used the model to
estimate the annual energy consumption of English households by
year (t = 1 to T) and energy carrier (f — gas, heating oil, solid fuels,
electricity) and then divide by the total number of households to give
the average annual household consumption of each energy carrier
(Eft).We thenmodel the adoption of the relevant measure by all eligible
households (whichmay be a subset of the total) and re-estimate the av-
erage household consumption of each energy carrier (Eft′) — assuming
that consumption of the relevant energy service remains unchanged
in the casemeasures 1–6 and falls in the case ofmeasure 8. The estimat-
ed fractional change in the average annual household consumption of
energy carrier f as a result of the measure is then:
ΔEft
Eft
¼ E
0
ft−Eft
Eft
: ð13Þ
With this approach, the estimated energy savings are averaged over
all households but only a portionmay be eligible for and hence beneﬁt-
ing from the relevant measure (e.g. not all dwellings have cavity walls).
This means that, in percentage terms, the estimated average energy
savingsmay be less thanwould be obtained for an individual household
undertaking the measure, but are representative of the percentage
energy savings achievable from the measure by English households as
a whole. Similarly, while individual households may only use a single
energy carrier (f) for heating, the energy savings are averaged over
the mix of all energy carriers used in English households. We take
these ﬁgures as representative of UK households.
We then use these estimates to adjust our estimates of the GHG emis-
sions associated with expenditure on gas, other fuels and electricity (l)
by householdswithin each quintile (Hlt
j
).We derive the latter as follows:
H jlt ¼ ultX jlt ð14Þ
where l = gas, electricity and other fuels; X lt
j (in £) is the mean
equivalised expenditure on category l in year t by households in quintile
j; and ult (in tCO2e/£) is an estimate of the GHG intensity of this expendi-
ture in 2004, derived from SELMA. This process involves translating esti-
mates for the four energy carriers (f) used by the CDEM into estimates for
the three relevant expenditure categories (l) used by SELMA.
By proceeding in this way, we ensure that our estimates of the
engineering effect are consistentwith our estimates of the income effect
which rely upon the same data sources. In addition, this allows both
saved expenditure and the engineering effect to vary between quintiles.
The use of equivalised expenditures in Eq. (14) means that H lt
j
repre-
sents equivalised emissions rather than actual emissions, but this does
not affect our estimates of rebound effects since we adjust all other
variables in the same way (see below).
For households in each quintile, the estimated change in equivalised
GHG emissions associated with consumption of gas, electricity and
other fuels (ΔH t
j) is given by:
ΔHjt ¼
X
l
ΔElt
Elt
H jlt : ð15Þ
The other three measures (7, 9 and 10) only affect a single expendi-
ture category (m), namely vehicle fuels in the case of measures 7 and 9
and food and non-alcoholic beverages in the case of measure 10. For
these measures, we use a simpler approach to estimate the fractional
savings in GHG emissions from the relevant category for an average
UK household (pmt) and then use this to estimate the change in
equivalised GHG emissions for households in each quintile as follows:
ΔHjt ¼ pmtH jmt ð16Þ
where (0≤ pmt≤ 1).We termΔH t
j
the engineering effect of themeasure
for quintile j in year t.A.2. Estimating the Embodied Effect
For the efﬁciency measures, we use the results of a number of LCA
studies to estimate the GHG emissions incurred in manufacturing and
supplying the relevant equipment (Chitnis et al., 2013). We assign
these embodied emissions to the year in which themeasure is installed
anddivide by the total number of dwellings to give the averagehousehold
embodied emissions for the relevant measure (M′t). We assume that the
economic lifetime of each measure is greater than T, so the embodied
emissions are only relevant for the base year (i.e.M′t = 0 for t N 1).
Following Chitnis et al. (2013), we also estimate the average embod-
ied emissions of the relevant alternative for each household (Mt). If this
alternative has an economic lifetime that is less than T, themeasure will
avoid the purchase of equipment in subsequent years, with the result
that the embodied emissions associated with those purchases are also
avoided (i.e. Mt N 0 for some t N 1). This is the case, for example, with
conventional lighting which has a shorter lifetime than energy efﬁcient
lighting.
The difference between these two estimates represents the
incremental embodied emissions associated with the measure in each
year. To estimate these emissions on an equivalised basis for each quin-
tile, we adjust by themean household composition in that quintile (n j):
ΔMjt ¼
M0t−Mt
 
nj
: ð17Þ
We term ΔMtj the embodied effect of the measure for quintile j in
year t.
A.3. Estimating the Income Effect
In the UK, household electricity and fuel bills normally include a
ﬁxed annual charge (aft in £/dwelling/year) and a charge per unit of en-
ergy used (kft in £/kWh). Efﬁciency and sufﬁciency improvements only
affect the latter. Following Chitnis et al. (2013), we use data on energy
consumption by fuel type for an average English household in 2009
(Eft in kWh) to estimate the percentage change in mean annual energy
expenditures following the adoption of each of the domestic energy
measures (1–6 and 8):
ΔCft
Cft
¼ kftΔEft
aft þ kftEft
  : ð18Þ
We then map these estimates onto the corresponding expenditure
categories (l= gas, electricity, other fuels) and estimate the change in
mean annual equivalised energy expenditures for households in each
quintile (ΔX t
j
) as follows:
ΔX jt ¼
X
l
ΔClt
Clt
X jlt : ð19Þ
For efﬁciency measures, we also estimate the capital cost associated
with installing the measure in all eligible dwellings and divide by the
total number of dwellings to give the average capital cost per household
(K′t). We do the same for the relevant alternative (Kt), with the differ-
ence between the two representing the incremental capital cost of
each measure in each year (ΔKt). The equivalised incremental capital
cost for households in each quintile is then given by:
ΔK jt ¼
K 0t−Kt
 
nj
: ð20Þ
We assume that the full capital costs are incurred in the year in
which the measure is installed (i.e. K′t = 0 for t N 1). Again, if the
29M. Chitnis et al. / Ecological Economics 106 (2014) 12–32relevant alternative has an economic lifetime that is less than T, the
measure avoids equipment purchases in subsequent years (i.e. Kt N 0
for some t N 1). For simplicity, we do not discount these avoided capital
costs. Incremental capital costs are zero for the sufﬁciency measures
(8–10) and we assume they are also zero for the fuel-efﬁcient car
(measure 7).
We treat the sum of the change in expenditures in the relevant
categories and the net capital payments in a given year as analogous
to a change in equivalised income for each quintile (ΔY t
j):
ΔY jt ¼− ΔC jt þ ΔK jt
 
: ð21Þ
We assume that households divide their annual disposable income
between their expenditure on goods and services (X t
j
) and savings
(S t
j
= r jY t
j
), where r j is the fractional savings rate of quintile j:
Y jt ¼ X jt þ r jY jt : ð22Þ
We use estimates of savings rates by quintile derived from the LCFS
and constrain them to be non-negative (Crossley and O'Dea, 2010).18
While uncertain, this approach allows the environmental impact of
savings to be incorporated within the analysis. The change in savings
for each quintile is then given by:
ΔS jt ¼ r jΔY jt : ð23Þ
The change in mean equivalised total expenditure by households in
each quintile (ΔX t
j
) is then given by:
ΔX jt ¼
XI
i¼1
ΔX jit ¼ 1−r j
 
ΔY jt ð24Þ
where ΔX t
j
represents the change in equivalised expenditure on
category i by quintile j. From consumer demand theory, the ‘adding up
restriction’ leads to the so-called ‘Engel aggregation condition’, as
follows (Deaton and Muelbauer, 1980):
XI
i¼1
ε ji X
j
it ¼ 1−r j
 
Y jt ð25Þ
where ε i
j
represents the expenditure elasticity of category i for house-
holds in quintile j. For sufﬁciency measures, we do not allow
re-spending in the commodity categories that are directly affected by
the relevant measure (e.g. food and non-alcoholic beverages in the
case of eliminating food waste). Similarly, when the sufﬁciency
measures are combined, we do not allow any re-spending between
the relevant categories (e.g. savings from eliminating food waste are
not re-spent on increased driving).
Letting ust represent the GHG intensity of UK investment
(in tCO2e/£), the mean change in equivalised GHG emissions for
households in quintile j as a consequence of the change in disposable
income is then given by:
ΔGjt ¼
XI
i¼1
uitΔX
j
it
h i
þ ustr jΔY jt : ð26Þ18 Our assumptions are based on Crossley and O'Dea (2010) as follows: Q1 = 0%;
Q2 = 9%; Q3 = 15%; Q4= 20%; Q5= 30%. Saving is calculated as income minus expen-
diture, and the saving rate as saving divided by income. However, this calculation is inac-
curate because LCF income excludes key categories such as withdrawal of savings, loans,
receipts from maturing insurance policies and proceeds from the sale of assets. Since re-
corded expenditure reﬂects these items, there is no reason why income and expenditure
should balance. In practice, measured expenditure exceeds measured income at the bot-
tom end of the income distribution.Using the deﬁnition of expenditure elasticity, the mean change in
equivalised expenditure on category i in year t by households in quintile
j can be written as:
ΔX jit ¼ ε ji
ΔY jt
Y jt
X jit : ð27Þ
Substituting ΔX it
j
from Eq. (27) into Eq. (26):
ΔG jt ¼
ΔY jt
Y jt
" #XI
i¼1
uitε
j
i X
j
it
h i
þ ustr jΔY jt : ð28Þ
Substituting for Y t
j
from Eq. (25), this can also be written as:
ΔGjt ¼ ΔY jt
1−rtð ÞXI
i¼1
ε ji X
j
it
XI
i¼1
uitε
j
i X
j
it
h i
þ ustr j
2
66664
3
77775: ð29Þ
We term ΔG tj the income effect of the energy efﬁciency improve-
ment for quintile j in year t.
Annex B. Key Assumptions
B.1. GHG Savings
Our assumptions for the GHG savings from the domestic energy
measures are derived from the CDEM and described in Chitnis et al.
(2013). For the vehicle and food measures, we assume the following:
• Efﬁcient car: Fuel efﬁcient diesel cars such as theAudiA31.6 can achieve
~100 g CO2/km in test cycles, corresponding to ~115 g CO2/km in real
world conditions (DEFRA, 2012). This compares to a UK new car
average in 2009 of ~172 g CO2/km19 and a ﬂeet average of
~177 g CO2/km. Hence, with no change in driving patterns, households
that replaced a typical car with an average new car should reduce their
vehicle fuel emissions by ~3%, while households that purchased a fuel-
efﬁcient diesel should instead reduce their emissions by ~35%. We take
the difference between these two estimates (32%) as the incremental
emission reductions from purchasing the latter instead of the former
and further assume that this measure applies to the ~7% of cars that
are scrapped and replaced in the base year. Since the averageUKhouse-
hold owns 1.14 cars (DfT, 2012b), this corresponds to a ~2.6% reduction
in vehicle-relatedGHGemissions for an average household.Weuse this
to adjust our estimates of the emissions associated with vehicle fuel
consumption for each quintile — which in turn reﬂect differing levels
of car ownership and use within each quintile.
• Reducing car use: Some22% of UK car trips are of less than twomiles and
these are estimated to account for ~3% of total car mileage and ~4.9% of
total car emissions (DfT, 2012a).20We use the latter ﬁgure to adjust our
estimates of the emissions associatedwith vehicle fuel consumption for
each quintile.
• Eliminating food waste: Quested and Parry (2011) estimate that the
averageUKhousehold throwsaway18%of its food anddrinkpurchases,
and that 12% of this waste is avoidable. To a ﬁrst approximation, elimi-
nating this avoidable waste should reduce the embodied emissions as-
sociated with food consumption by 12% as well.21 We use this ﬁgure to19 Test cycle emissions for new diesel cars averaged 149.9 g CO2/km in 2009, while those
for new petrol cars averaged 149.5 g CO2/km.We apply an uplift factor of 15% to estimate
emissions under ‘real-world’ driving conditions (DEFRA, 2012) and assume UK averages
are the same as GB.
20 This allows for the slower average speeds and cold start penalty associatedwith short
journeys (DfT, 2008).
21 In practice, theGHG intensity of the foodmost commonly thrown awaymay be higher
or lower than the average GHG intensity of the food and non-alcoholic beverages category
(WRAP, 2009, 2010).
30 M. Chitnis et al. / Ecological Economics 106 (2014) 12–32adjust our estimates of the emissions associated with food and non-
alcoholic beverages consumption by each quintile.
The results are summarised in Table A.1.Table A.1
Estimated percentage change in GHG emissions by category following the adoption of
each measure by an ‘average’ UK household over a period of 10 years.
No. Measure Gas Electricity Other
fuels
Vehicle
fuels
Food
1 Cavity wall insulation −8.8 −1.7 −7.2 – –
2 Loft insulation −2.2 −0.5 −2.3 – –
3 Condensing boiler −11.8 0.6 −0.1 – –
4 Tank insulation −1.8 −1.6 −1.9 – –
5 CFL lighting 0.9 −4.5 0.9 – –
6 LED lighting 1.1 −5.4 1.0 – –
7 Efﬁcient car – – – −2.6 –
8 Temperature reduction −9.4 −2.0 −10.5 – –
9 Car use reduction – – – −4.9 –
10 Food waste reduction – – – – −12.0
11 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 −22.4 −7.6 −10.6 – –
12 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 −22.2 −8.5 −10.4 – –
13 8, 9 and 10 −9.4 −2.0 −10.5 −4.9 −12.0
Note: Estimates refer to an average household with a mean level of equivalised total
expenditure.
Table A.3
Estimated percentage change in annual expenditure by category following the adoption of
each measure by an average UK household over a period of 10 years.
No. Measure Gas Electricity Other
fuels
Vehicle
fuels
Food
1 Cavity wall insulation −7.7 −1.5 −7.1 – –
2 Loft insulation −1.9 −0.4 −2.3 – –
3 Condensing boiler −10.3 0.6 −0.1 – –
4 Tank insulation −1.5 −1.5 −1.8 – –
5 CFLs 0.8 −4.1 0.8 – –
6 LEDs 1.0 −5.0 1.0 – –
7 Efﬁcient car −2.8
8 Temperature reduction −8.2 −1.9 −10.5 – –
9 Car use reduction −4.9
10 Food waste reduction −12
11 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 −19.4 −7.0 −10.5 – –
12 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 −19.3 −7.8 −10.4 – –
13 8, 9 and 10 −8.2 −1.9 −10.5 −4.9 −12
Note: Estimates refer to an average household and are derived by estimating the emission
reductions associated with all eligible households adopting the measure and dividing by
the total number of households.B.2. Embodied EmissionsTable A.2
Estimated incremental embodied emissions associated with implementing each measure
in an average household over a period of 10 years.
No. Measure Embodied emissions (kg CO2e)
1 Cavity wall insulation 55.2
2 Loft insulation 118.3
3 Condensing boiler –
4 Tank insulation 2.3
5 CFLs 2.6
6 LEDs 24.5
7 Efﬁcient car 0
8 Temperature reduction 0
9 Car use reduction 0
10 Food waste reduction 0
11 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 178.4
12 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 200.3
13 8, 9 and 10 0
Note: Estimates for an average household are derived by estimating the incremental em-
bodied emissions associated with all eligible households adopting the measure, dividing
by the total number of households and then dividing by the mean equivalised size of UK
households (Table 4). Table A.4
Estimated incremental capital cost associated with implementing each measure in an
average UK household over a period of ten years.
No. Measure Capital cost Capital costB.3. Cost Savingswithout subsidy with subsidy
1 Cavity wall insulation 179 41
2 Loft insulation 235 54
3 Condensing boiler 0 0
4 Tank insulation 18 6
5 CFLs 58 58
6 LEDs 253 127
7 Efﬁcient car 0 0
8 Temperature reduction 0 0
9 Car use reduction 0 0Our assumptions for the cost savings frommeasures 1–6 are derived
from the CDEM and described in Chitnis et al. (2013). For the other
measures, we assume that reducing food waste will reduce food-
related expenditure by 12%, reducing car use will reduce expenditure
on vehicle fuels by ~4.9% and purchasing a fuel-efﬁcient car will reduce
expenditure on vehicle fuels by ~35% relative to purchasing an average
new car.22 Sincewe assume that only 7% of the car stock is replaced, this
leads to a ~2.8% reduction in expenditure on vehicle fuels for an average22 Assuming: a) average fuel efﬁciencies of 6.5 l/100 km, 5.7 l/100 km and4 l/100 km for
new petrol, diesel and fuel-efﬁcient diesel cars respectively; b) a 50:50 split between pet-
rol and diesel in new car purchases; c) average 2009 fuel prices of £1.29/litre for petrol and
£1.26/litre for diesel; d) an average of 1.14 cars per household; and e) replacement of 7%of
the current vehicle stock. Households purchasing a new fuel-efﬁcient diesel would reduce
expenditure on vehicle fuels by ~37.5% compared to an average existing vehicle and by
~35% compared to an average new vehicle. We scale the latter ﬁgure to reﬂect our as-
sumption that only 7% of the stock is replaced.household. There will also be additional savings on vehicle excise duty,
since low emission vehicles (b100 g CO2/km) are exempt. Allowing for
this increases the total annual cost savings by some 36%. The resulting
assumptions are summarised in Table A.2.B.4. Capital Costs
Estimates of the incremental capital cost of each measure, with and
without subsidies, are summarised in Table A.3. These represent the dif-
ference between the capital cost of the measure and the capital cost (if
any) of the relevant counterfactual, such as continuing to use existing
lightbulbs. The estimates for the domestic energy measures are based
upon information provided by DECC (2010b) and described in Chitnis
et al. (2013). For simplicity, we assume that the incremental capital
cost of a fuel-efﬁcient diesel car is zero, although since such cars tend
to be smaller, lighter and have fewer features, the incremental cost
could be negative. As a result, our estimate of the rebound effect for
this measure may be conservative.
(See Table A.4.)10 Food waste reduction 0 0
11 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 409 80
12 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 605 149
13 8, 9 and 10 0 0
Note: Estimates for an average household are derived by estimating the capital costs asso-
ciated with all eligible households adopting the measure, dividing by the total number of
households and then dividing by mean equivalised size of UK households (Table 4). The
with-subsidies estimates take into account the level of CERT subsidies available for differ-
ent socio-economic groups, aswell as theproportion of installations expectedwithin each.
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GHG intensities, expenditure shares and share of GHG emissions by category for an average household.
No. Description GHG intensity (kg CO2e/£) (uit) GHG intensity as % of gas Expenditure share in 2009 (%) (Xi / X) GHG emissions as % of total (i / H)
1 Food & non-alcoholic beverages 1.05 22.4 13.9 12.9
2 Alcohol and tobacco 0.26 5.6 3.1 0.7
3 Clothing & footwear 0.54 11.5 5.4 2.6
4 Electricity 5.04 107.1 2.8 12.5
5 Gas 4.70 100.0 2.5 10.5
6 Other fuels 6.95 147.8 0.6 3.9
7 Other housing 0.28 6.0 9.2 2.3
9 Furnishings etc. 0.75 16.0 7.6 5.0
9 Health 0.35 7.4 1.5 0.5
10 Vehicle fuels and lubricants 2.61 55.5 5.0 11.5
11 Other transport 1.25 26.7 10.0 11.0
12 Communication 0.43 9.2 3.1 1.2
13 Recreation & culture 0.65 13.8 15.2 8.7
14 Education 0.25 5.4 1.4 0.3
15 Restaurants & hotels 0.59 12.5 9.7 5.0
16 Miscellaneous 0.52 11.1 9.1 4.2
Saving 0.57 12.1 – 7.4B.6. Estimated EffectsTable A.6
Estimated engineering, embodied, income and total effects (ignoring capital cost) for an average household (percentage of baseline GHG emissions).
No. Measure Engineering effect Embodied effect Income effect Net effect
1 Cavity wall insulation −1.4% 0.025% 0.2% −1.18%
2 Loft insulation −0.4% 0.053% 0.1% −0.27%
3 Condensing boiler −1.2% – 0.2% −1.00%
4 Tank insulation −0.5% 0.001% 0.1% −0.39%
5 CFL lighting −0.4% 0.001% 0.1% −0.37%
6 LED lighting −0.5% 0.011% 0.1% −0.43%
7 Efﬁcient car −0.3% – 0.1% −0.16%
8 Temperature reduction −1.6% – 0.2% −1.42%
9 Car use reduction −0.6% – 0.2% −0.41%
10 Food waste reduction −1.5% – 1.2% −0.35%
11 1–5 −3.7% 0.080% 0.6% −3.08%
12 1–4 and 6 −3.8% 0.090% 0.6% −3.15%
13 8, 9 and 10 −3.8% – 1.3% −2.42%B.7. Engel CurvesTable A.7
Estimated Working Leser Engel curves for whole sample in 2009.
Category αi βi γi R
2
Food & non-alcoholic beverages 0.57 (41.84)* −0.09 (−36.78)* 0.0009 (13.89)* 0.32
Alcoholic beverages & tobacco 0.11 (12.33)* −0.01 (−8.64)* −0.0001 (−3.10)* 0.02
Clothing & footwear −0.01 (−1.58) 0.02 (11.47)* −0.0004 (−7.72)* 0.04
Electricity 0.16 (24.66)* −0.03 (−23.45)* 0.0003 (10.57)* 0.23
Gas 0.12 (18.61)* −0.02 (−17.60)* 0.0004 (10.77)* 0.13
Other fuels 0.01 (1.52) −0.001 (−1.95)* 0.0002 (5.97)* 0.01
Other housing 0.33 (17.64)* −0.03 (−10.43)* −0.001 (−9.83)* 0.03
Furnishings −0.12 (−8.07)* 0.03 (11.39)* 0.0006 (7.15)* 0.04
Health −0.04 (−6.23)* 0.01 (6.47)* 0.0003 (7.68)* 0.02
Vehicle fuels & lubricants 0.02 (2.97) 0.01 (6.39)* −0.0002 (−3.88)* 0.01
Other transport −0.17 (−11.16)* 0.05 (19.90)* −0.0005 (−5.50)* 0.09
Communication 0.14 (25.24)* −0.02 (−20.98)* −0.0001 (−2.15)* 0.12
Recreation & culture −0.12 (−6.31)* 0.04 (12.91)* 0.0005 (5.82)* 0.04
Education −0.05 (−7.09)* 0.01 (8.61)* −0.0002 (−5.12)* 0.03
Restaurants and hotels −0.003 (−0.21) 0.02 (10.79)* −0.0005 (−7.42)* 0.04
Miscellaneous goods & services 0.04 (3.68)* 0.01 (3.91)* −0.00001 (−0.11) 0.004
Notes: Estimatedwith OLS over the full sample of households using ‘White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance’ to correct for heteroskedasticity. The t-statistics for
each parameter are shown in parenthesis, with single asterisk indicating the estimate is signiﬁcant at the 5% probability level.
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